Recently, a new scheme was proposed for deniable authentication. Its main originality lied on applying a chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm and the semi-group property of the Chebyshev chaotic map. Although original and practicable, its insecurity and inefficiency are shown in this paper, thus rendering it inadequate for adoption in e-commerce.
Introduction
In recent years, chaos-based cryptography is drawing a great deal of attention from researchers from a variety of disciplines [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . One of the most interesting encryption algorithms based on chaos proposed to date exploited the ergodic property of chaotic orbits [6] . In the following years, many other works enhanced or analyzed its speed and security [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . More recently, a new scheme for deniable authentication making use of a chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm and the semi-group property of the Chebyshev chaotic map was proposed [15] . In this paper it is shown that the authors' claim to be "secure and efficient" may be contradicted.
The scheme
According to [16] , the two main characteristics of deniable authentication are: i) a sender S (also called prover in the literature) is able to authenticate a message m to a receiver R (also called verifier ); and ii) the receiver R is unable to convince a third party that a message m was authenticated by S. An attacker M (acting as man-in-the-middle between S and R) should not be able to authenticate a message m to R which S does not authenticate for M.
Many different constructions of deniable authentication protocols have been published based on traditional cryptography (see for example [16] and references therein). Usually, these protocols require at a minimum a hashing algorithm and a public key cryptography algorithm. The scheme proposed in [15] uses the chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm defined in [8, 10] and the Chebyshev chaotic map to realize key agreement, as proposed in [17] .
Encryption-hash
The encryption-hash algorithm uses the logistic map
where y n ∈ [0, 1] and the parameter is 3.99 < b < 4.0, so that it behaves chaotically. Following [6] , the interval [y min , y max ], where 0 < y min < y max < 1, is divided up into s = 256 subintervals, in one-to-one correspondence to as many ASCII characters (see Fig. 1 ). The secret key is given by the initial point y 0 and the parameter value b. To encrypt an 8-bit block, i.e., an ASCII character, the orbit is iterated starting from y 0 as many times as necessary until it lands on the subinterval corresponding to the given ASCII symbol. The number of iterations is recorded as the corresponding block ciphertext. This procedure is repeated until the plaintext is exhausted.
In [8] , a dynamic table is used for looking up the ciphertext and plaintext, which is no longer fixed during the whole encryption and decryption processes as in [6] . Instead, it depends on the plaintext, being continuously updated during the encryption and decryption processes. When the ith message block is encrypted, the look-up table is updated dynamically by exchanging the ith entry l i with another entry l j . The location of the latter entry, i.e., the value of j, is determined by the current value of y using the following formula:
where y min and y max are the end points of the chosen interval [y min , y max ) and s is the total number of entries in the table [8] .
In [10] , the previously described chaotic cryptographic scheme is generalized by allowing the swapping of multiple pairs of entries in the look-up table during the encryption of each input block, and by allowing multiple runs of encryption on the whole message continuously. Starting from the current entry i, p pairs of entries (p ≥ 1) are swapped according to the following rule:
Once the message has been encrypted, the whole process is repeated again r times, r ≥ 1. The final look-up table is the hash of the message [10] .
Session key agreement
The key agreement protocol is based on Chebyshev polynomials and their properties. The Chebyshev polynomial of degree n is defined as
The polynomial T n (x) is recursively defined as
where T 0 (x) = 1 and T 1 (x) = x. Chebyshev polynomials verify the semigroup property: T p (T q (x)) = T pq (x); and also commute under composition:
). These two properties make them eligible for public key cryptography and authentication [17] .
The key agreement process described in [15] is as follows:
(1) S and R choose a publicly known random number x ∈ [−1, 1].
(2) S chooses a random large integer p, computes P = T p (x) and sends P to R. (3) R chooses a random large integer q, computes Q = T q (x) and sends Q to S. (4) S computes the secret key as
Due to the semi-group property, k = k ′ = T pq (x). All the communication steps are susceptible to interception and manipulation by an attacker: x, P = T p (x), and Q = T q (x) might be known or altered by the attacker acting as a man-inthe-middle M. The security of this algorithm relies on the assumption that given only the pair (x, T n (x)) it is very difficult to compute the order of the polynomial n.
Deniable authentication protocol
Once S and R have agreed on a common session key k as described before, S computes E k (m) and obtains the hash value H(m) simultaneously. S sends E k (m) and H(m) to R. Now R can decrypt D k (E k (m)) = m using the same session key k, obtaining simultaneously the hash value H ′ (m). If both hashes H and H ′ are identical, R is assured that the message m was sent by S. For a more thorough description of the scheme, the reader is referred to the original work [15] .
Analysis of the scheme
In this section, the insecurity and inefficiency of the scheme proposed in [15] are analyzed.
Security analysis of the scheme
The security of the encryption-hash algorithm [8, 10] was already studied in [18] , where it was showed that:
• The algorithm is vulnerable to chosen-ciphertext, chosen-plaintext and knownplaintext attacks. As a consequence, implementations of this algorithm can never reuse the same key because if so, they are easily broken.
• The look-up table, and thus the hash, does not depend on the key, but only on the plaintext, thus facilitating cryptanalysis.
• Breaking the hash algorithm is possible when p = 1 and r = 1, even without the knowledge of the key k (y 0 and b). In fact, it is easy to find two different messages m and m ′ such that H(m) = H(m ′ ).
These results imply that successive messages authenticated by S should always use different session keys, thus reproducing the key agreement protocol every time. This setting is fundamental to avoid the attacks mentioned in the first bullet. In order to avoid the type of attacks on the hashing scheme described in the third bullet, it is all important that r > 1 and p > 1. Due to the complexity of the attacks, the reader is referred to [18] for a more detailed explanation.
On the other hand, the security of the key agreement protocol was studied in [19] , where it was showed that an attack permits to recover the corresponding plaintext from a given ciphertext. The same attack can be applied to produce forgeries if the cryptosystem used for signing messages, as used in [15] . The weak spot of the protocol lies on the fact that there are several Chebyshev polynomials passing through the same point. The attack works as follows.
It is assumed that M knows x, T p (x) and T q (x), which are publicly available in the communication channel between S and R. To get the secret key k:
Given x and T p (x), it can be efficiently computed an integer solution p ′ to the equation
The reader is referred to [19] for the details on how to solve the previous equation, using a system of two linear equations. This attack allows M to actively forge a message from S to R, which makes the authentication property fail (Sec. 3.2.2 in [15] ), or to passively decrypt messages sent to R by S, which makes the security property fail (Sec. 3.2.3 in [15] ).
Efficiency analysis of the scheme
Finally, in [15] it is claimed that the chaos-based encryption-hash parallel algorithm "saves certain computation time when compared with traditional hashing and cryptographic methods". This assertion might be interpreted in the sense that their algorithm is faster than traditional hashing and cryptographic methods, when in fact it is several orders of magnitude slower. Table 1 of [10] gives some results to illustrate the performance of the proposed chaotic cryptographic and hashing algorithm. The performance depends on the values of p and r. The best speed achieved is between 7.7 and 11.5 KB/s in a 1.8 GHz processor. On the other hand, traditional encryption algorithms, such as DES or AES, achieve speeds of 21.3 and 61.0 MB/s respectively in a 2.1 GHz processor [20] . With respect to traditional hashing algorithms, MD5 and SHA-1, the two most widely used, achieve speeds of 216.6 and 67.9 MB/s respectively in a 2.1 GHz processor [20] . Thus, the claim is proved to be inadequate. As a consequence, this algorithm is also very inefficient (between 1,000 and 10,000 times slower) when compared to similar traditional algorithms.
Conclusion
The attacks proposed in [18] and [19] do not make the deniable authentication protocol presented in [15] secure. An attacker can forge messages in the name of the sender, thus violating the authentication requirement, and can decrypt messages sent by the sender, thus violating the security (confidentiality) requirement. On the other hand, the use of an encryption-hash algorithm based on discrete chaotic maps and on the ergodic property of chaotic orbits greatly reduces the protocol speed, making it inefficient as compared to other similar protocols. After these attacks, it is concluded that the lack of security, along with the low operation speed, may discourage the use of this scheme for secure applications.
Figures Fig. 1 . Schematic representation of how an attractor is divided into s subintervals, each one with size ǫ = (y max − y min )/s. An alphabet unit is associated for each subinterval.
